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THE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL SAFEGUARDS 
AGAINST RACIST POLICE PRACTICES: A 
CALL FOR CHANGE TO MASSACHUSETTS 
& ILLINOIS WIRETAPPING LAWS 
Andrew Martinez Whitson* 
Abstract: Police misconduct is still prevalent throughout the United 
States. Unfortunately for members of minority communities, this miscon-
duct often comes in the form of racially discriminatory police practices. 
In many cases, such practices are deeply rooted in the police depart-
ment’s culture. It is imperative that all citizens are equipped with every 
possible safeguard from such abuse at the hands of the police. In Massa-
chusetts and Illinois, however, wiretapping and eavesdropping laws pre-
vent people from employing one such safeguard that has proven to help 
change unconstitutional police practices. The safeguard that those laws 
criminalize is the ability to surreptitiously record on-duty police. This 
Note recommends that state legislatures in Massachusetts and Illinois cre-
ate exceptions to their wiretapping and eavesdropping laws so as to allow 
surreptitious recording of on-duty police officers. 
Introduction 
 Early in the morning on April 17, 2010, in Seattle, Washington, 
Martin Monetti, Jr. and two of his friends were walking home after 
celebrating Monetti’s twenty-first birthday.1 All of a sudden, Monetti 
and his friends were surrounded by police cars and ordered to the 
ground.2 The officers were there to investigate an armed robbery that 
had occurred at the location from which Monetti and his friends had 
just left.3 
 While lying prone on the ground, Monetti was subjected to a bar-
rage of verbal and physical abuse.4 Detective Shandy Cobane leaned 
                                                                                                                      
* Editor-in-Chief, Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice (2013–2014). 
1 Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights and Personal Injury at 3, Monetti v. City of 
Seattle, No. 2:11-cv-01041-RSM (W.D. Wash. Feb. 13, 2012) [hereinafter Complaint]. 
2 Id. 
3 Id.; Sara Jean Green, Racial-Slur Lawsuit Settled, but Lawyer Critical of Police, Seattle 
Times, June 28, 2012, at B1. 
4 See Complaint, supra note 1, at 3; Seattle Times Staff, Videotaped SPD Incidents Led to 
Probe, Seattle Times (Sept. 21, 2012), http://seattletimes.com/flatpages/local/video 
taped-spd-incidents-led-to-federal-probe.html. 
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down into Monetti’s face and threatened him with an overtly racist 
comment, stating, “I will beat the fucking Mexican piss out of you 
homey. You feel me?”5 Moments later, Cobane stomped on Monetti’s 
hand and head when he made a motion to wipe his eye.6 Then, an-
other officer, Mary Woollum, went over to Monetti and stomped on the 
back of his legs for no apparent reason.7 
 Monetti was released after approximately thirty minutes.8 When he 
got up from the ground, the officers noticed that he was dazed and un-
steady on his feet.9 They did not, however, get him any medical atten-
tion.10 The other Seattle police officers who witnessed the assault on 
Monetti did nothing to stop the attacks, nor did they report the use of 
force to supervisors.11 
 Unbeknownst to the Seattle police officers, and luckily for Mr. 
Monetti, there was a freelance photographer across the street with a 
video camera.12 This unnamed person gave the video depicting the at-
tack to a Seattle television station, and it soon became a well-publicized 
incident.13 The video sparked an internal affairs investigation into the 
officers’ actions.14 Moreover, together with other videos of Seattle po-
lice misconduct, it helped lead to an investigation by the Department 
of Justice (DOJ) of the Seattle Police Department’s (“SPD”) use of ex-
cessive force, particularly against minorities.15 The City of Seattle ulti-
mately settled a lawsuit filed by Monetti for $150,000.16 
* * * 
                                                                                                                      
5 Complaint, supra note 1, at 3; dcpolls, Seattle Police Video Allegedly Shows Officers Stomp-
ing and Kicking Suspect, YouTube (May 9, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tc-
oiM6SS6E. 
6 Complaint, supra note 1, at 3; Seattle Cops Stomp on Detainee, Kirotv.com (May 7, 
2010), http://www.kirotv.com/news/news/seattle-cops-stomp-on-detainee/nDRHc/. 
7 See Complaint, supra note 1, at 3; Kirotv.com, supra note 6. 
8 See Complaint, supra note 1, at 3; Kirotv.com, supra note 6. 
9 Kirotv.com, supra note 6. 
10 See id. 
11 Complaint, supra note 1, at 3, 6. 
12 See Kirotv.com, supra note 6; dcpolls, supra note 5. 
13 See Kirotv.com, supra note 6; Seattle Times Staff, supra note 4. 
14 Kirotv.com, supra note 6. 
15 Seattle Times Staff, supra note 4; see Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Att’y 
Gen., Civil Rights Div., and Jenny A. Durkan, U.S. Attorney, W. Dist. of Wash., to Hon. Mi-
chael McGinn, Mayor, City of Seattle, at 3, 27 (Dec. 16, 2011), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/spd_findletter_12-16-11.pdf [hereinaf-
ter SPD Investigation] (detailing results of the Seattle Police Department’s civil rights pat-
tern or practice investigation). 
16 Notice of Settlement of All Claims, Monetti v. City of Seattle, No. 2:11-cv-01041-RSM 
(W.D. Wash. June 27, 2012); Green, supra note 3. 
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 On June 3, 2011, Alvin, a teenage Harlem resident, was walking 
home from his girlfriend’s house when he was stopped by the New York 
City police.17 The officers stopped and frisked Alvin, then let him go.18 
After Alvin walked two more blocks, three different plain-clothed police 
officers again stopped him.19 Alvin told them he had just been stopped 
and asked why they were stopping him again.20 One of the officers re-
sponded by saying that Alvin looked suspicious since he was wearing his 
hood up.21 Another officer then threatened Alvin, stating that he was 
going to slap him if he did not shut his mouth.22 
 The officers made Alvin put his hands on top of his head while 
they frisked him and searched through his pockets.23 The officers then 
began to twist Alvin’s arm behind his back and asked him if he wanted 
to go to jail.24 When Alvin asked what he was being arrested for, one of 
the officers responded, “For being a fucking mutt.”25 The officer pro-
ceeded to say, “Dude, I am gonna fuckin’ break your arm, then I’m 
gonna punch you in the fuckin’ face.”26 The encounter lasted less than 
two minutes and ended with the officers pushing Alvin down the side-
walk and telling him to “take a fucking walk.”27 
 When he saw the officers initially approach, Alvin realized that 
they were going to perform a stop-and-frisk on him, so he secretly re-
corded the interaction on his cell phone.28 The surreptitious recording 
became one of the only known recordings of New York City police offi-
cers performing a stop-and-frisk.29 The recording also led to Alvin be-
coming the subject of a documentary on the controversial stop-and-
frisk policy, which was in turn covered by national media outlets such as 
The Nation and New York Magazine.30 
                                                                                                                      
17 Ross Tuttle & Erin Schneider, Stopped-and-Frisked: ‘For Being a F**king Mutt’ [VIDEO], 
Nation (Oct. 8, 2012), http://www.thenation.com/print/article/170413/stopped-and-
frisked-being-fking-mutt-video. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Joe Coscarelli, NYPD Officers Stop-and-Frisk Teen ‘For Being a F*cking Mutt’, N.Y. Mag. 
(Oct. 9, 2012), http://nymag.com/daily/intel/2012/10/nypd-stop-and-frisk-caught-on-
tape.html; Tuttle & Schneider, supra note 17. The documentary and full recording of Al-
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 New York City’s controversial “stop-and-frisk” crime fighting pro-
gram accounted for roughly half a million stop-and-frisk encounters 
each year.31 The stop-and-frisk program, supported by former Mayor 
Bloomberg, has come under fire for its racist and unjust application, 
but prior to Alvin’s stop, there had never been evidence substantiating 
these criticisms.32 
* * * 
 What Alvin and Mr. Monetti’s encounters have in common is that 
they both involved the surreptitious recording of on-duty police officers 
in public without the officers’ consent or knowledge.33 Alvin was able to 
audio record the police by using his cell phone.34 The freelance pho-
tographer in Monetti’s case filmed the officers from afar, but was still 
able to pick up the officers’ voices in his video.35 None of the officers 
involved appeared to know at the time that they were being recorded.36 
 With respect to these incidents in Washington and New York, the 
police were the subjects of legal recordings.37 Had the incidents oc-
curred in Illinois or Massachusetts, however, the recording of the offi-
cers’ racist statements and actions would have been illegal and subject 
to harsh criminal sanctions.38 The policy behind the prohibition of sur-
reptitious recordings is the notion that the officers’ right to privacy pro-
                                                                                                                      
vin’s encounter with the NYPD can be accessed online at http://www.thenation.com/ 
print/article/170413/stopped-and-frisked-being-fking-mutt-video. Tuttle & Schneider, 
supra note 17. On August 12, 2013, New York City was held liable for violating the Fourth 
and Fourteenth Amendment rights of petitioners in Floyd v. City of New York due to the 
NYPD’s racially discriminatory stop-and-frisk policy. 2013 WL 4046209, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 
12, 2013). The court found that of the 4.4 million stops conducted by the NYPD between 
January 2004 and June 2012, eighty percent were performed on blacks and Hispanics and 
at least 200,000 were made without reasonable suspicion. Id. at *1, 4. The court also noted 
that the NYPD’s practice of making these kinds of unconstitutional stops and unconstitu-
tional frisks was a form of racial profiling. Id. at *6–7. 
31 See Ray Rivera, Police-Stop Data Shows Pockets Where Force Is Used More Often, N.Y. Times, 
Aug. 16, 2012, at A17; Tuttle & Schneider, supra note 17. The number of stops rose from 
314,000 in 2004 to 686,000 in 2011. Floyd, 2013 WL 4046209, at *3. 
32 See Coscarelli, supra note 30; Tuttle & Schneider, supra note 17. 
33 See dcpolls, supra note 5; Kirotv.com, supra note 6; Tuttle & Schneider, supra note 
17. 
34 See Tuttle & Schneider, supra note 17. 
35 See dcpolls, supra note 5; Kirotv.com, supra note 6. 
36 See dcpolls, supra note 5; Tuttle & Schneider, supra note 17. 
37 See N.Y. Penal Law § 250.00 (McKinney 2008); Wash. Rev. Code § 9.73.030 (2012); 
State v. Flora, 845 P.2d 1355, 1358 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992). 
38 See 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/14-1 to -3 (2012); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 272, § 99 
(2010); ACLU v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 586 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 651 (2012); 
Commonwealth v. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d 963, 971 (Mass. 2001). 
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tects them from being recorded without their consent, or at least their 
knowledge, even when in public and on-duty.39 
 Laws preventing the legal recording of on-duty police officers un-
dermine police accountability.40 Surreptitious recordings of police mis-
conduct, especially those with racial overtones, have worked as an effec-
tive safeguard against institutionalized racism at the hands of the 
police.41 By criminalizing such recordings, however, the laws are acting 
instead to protect racist police officers.42 Thus, in order to ensure that 
racist actions by the police are not hidden from the public eye, it is 
necessary to permit these recordings without the consent or knowledge 
of the police.43 
 This Note argues that in order to fully protect citizens, particularly 
those in minority communities, from police misconduct, laws that pro-
hibit surreptitious recordings of on-duty police should be changed to 
allow such recordings. Part I of this Note will discuss the background of 
laws prohibiting surreptitious recordings of on-duty police officers, in-
cluding their purpose and the legal issues that arise therefrom. Part II 
will establish the fact that police misconduct is still prevalent in the 
United States, particularly against racial minorities. Part III will discuss 
how the ability to secretly record on-duty police has been integral in 
raising awareness of police misconduct and improving officer behavior. 
Finally, Part IV will suggest that in order to more effectively protect 
people from racist police actions, changes must be made to the laws 
prohibiting surreptitious recordings so that citizens may legally record 
on-duty police officers without their consent or knowledge. Ultimately, 
this Note advocates that state legislatures are in the best position to pro-
tect their citizens from police misconduct by adding exceptions to their 
                                                                                                                      
39 See Stephanie Claiborne, Comment, Is It Justice or a Crime to Record the Police?: A Look 
at the Illinois Eavesdropping Statute and Its Application, 45 J. Marshall L. Rev. 485, 496–97 
(2012); Marianne F. Kies, Note, Policing the Police: Freedom of the Press, the Right to Privacy, and 
Civilian Recordings of Police Activity, 80 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 274, 298–300 (2011). 
40 See Kies, supra note 39, at 301–03; Lisa A. Skehill, Note, Cloaking Police Misconduct in 
Privacy: Why the Massachusetts Anti-Wiretapping Statute Should Allow for the Surreptitious Re-
cording of Police Officers, 42 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 981, 1003–04 (2009). 
41 See Hyde, 750 N.E.2d at 971–72 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting) (referencing the role that 
the video recording of Rodney King’s beating played in concluding that police misconduct 
was a serious problem within the Los Angeles Police Department); Carly Humphrey, 
Comment, Keep Recording: Why On-Duty Police Officers Do Not Have a Protected Expectation of 
Privacy Under Maryland’s State Wiretap Act, 19 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 775, 806 (2012); Skehill, 
supra note 40, at 998–1000. 
42 See Humphrey, supra note 41, at 806; Kies, supra note 39, at 301–03; Skehill, supra 
note 40, at 999–1000. 
43 See Humphrey, supra note 41, at 806; Kies, supra note 39, at 301–03; Skehill, supra 
note 40, at 999–1000. 
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wiretapping laws that allow for the surreptitious recording of on-duty 
police officers. 
I. The Expanded Use of Wiretapping & Eavesdropping Laws 
 The federal government and nearly all states have wiretapping or 
eavesdropping statutes dictating when and how conversations can be 
recorded.44 The relative laws in Massachusetts and Illinois, however, set 
a much higher threshold compared to all other states for when a con-
versation can be legally recorded.45 These laws leave residents in those 
states unable to legally record on-duty police officers surreptitiously 
without their knowledge or consent.46 
A. The Birth of the Right to Privacy in Public 
 In 1967, the Supreme Court decided the landmark case of Katz v. 
United States.47 In Katz, the defendant argued that his right to privacy 
had been violated when the government used evidence against him 
that was collected without a warrant by listening in on telephone con-
versations he had from a public phone booth.48 The Court ultimately 
held that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places” and 
therefore, Katz was entitled to a right to privacy when having private 
conversations in a public phone booth.49 
 The following year, Congress passed a wiretapping statute to codify 
this newly recognized right to privacy.50 In the Omnibus Crime Control 
& Safe Streets Act of 1968, Congress prohibited the interception of any 
oral, wire, or electronic communication, unless one party to the com-
                                                                                                                      
44 See Omnibus Crime Control & Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2520 
(2006); see, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 632 (West 2010); N.Y. Penal Law § 250.00 (McKinney 
2008); Wash. Rev. Code § 9.73.030 (2012); see J. Peter Bodri, Articles Comments, Tapping 
into Police Conduct: The Improper Use of Wiretapping Laws to Prosecute Citizens Who Record On-
Duty Police, 19 Am. U.J. Gender Soc. Pol’y & L. 1327, 1332–34 (2011); Skehill, supra note 
40, at 990. 
45 See 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/14-1 to -3 (2012); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 272, § 99 (2010); 
Kies, supra note 39, at 285–90; Travis S. Triano, Note, Who Watches the Watchmen? Big Brother’s 
Use of Wiretap Statutes to Place Civilians in Timeout, 34 Cardozo L. Rev. 389, 395 (2012). 
46 See Kies, supra note 39, at 285–90; Triano, supra note 45, at 395. 
47 Bodri, supra note 44, at 1331; see Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351, 359 (1967). 
48 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 349–51; Skehill, supra note 40, at 988. 
49 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351–52; Skehill, supra note 40, at 988. 
50 See Omnibus Crime Control & Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2520 
(2006); Jesse Harlan Alderman, Police Privacy in the iPhone Era?: The Need for Safeguards in 
State Wiretapping Statutes to Preserve the Civilian’s Right to Record Public Police Activity, 9 First 
Amend. L. Rev. 487, 493 (2011); Skehill, supra note 40, at 989. 
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munication consents to the recording.51 The statute requires that the 
conversation demonstrates what society would consider to be both an 
objective and subjective expectation of privacy.52 This means that sur-
reptitiously recording a conversation taking place in a public setting 
would not violate the federal wiretapping statute because there is no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in a public place.53 
 Since the federal wiretapping statute preempts state wiretapping 
laws, states can only enact laws that are at least equally restrictive.54 
Many states, however, have chosen to pass more restrictive wiretapping 
and eavesdropping laws in an effort to further protect their citizens’ 
right to privacy.55 Most state laws adhere to the more lenient require-
ment that only one party must consent for the conversation to be le-
gally recorded.56 A minority of states, however, have opted to pass the 
more restrictive requirement of all-party consent.57 Of those states, all 
but two require that the parties involved in the conversation have a rea-
sonable expectation to privacy.58 Massachusetts and Illinois are the only 
states with all-party consent statutes that do not also require this rea-
sonable expectation to privacy. 59 
 When a wiretapping or eavesdropping statute does not require 
there to be a reasonable expectation of privacy, one may violate the 
statute even if the recorded conversation occurs openly in public.60 The 
lack of this requirement therefore greatly expands the scope of the 
statute since it prohibits public conversations from being recorded as 
well.61 When the statute criminalizes recording public conversations, it 
                                                                                                                      
51 See 18 U.S.C. § 2511; Bodri, supra note 44, at 1333; Skehill, supra note 40, at 989. 
52 See Alderman, supra note 50, at 492–93; Skehill, supra note 40, at 989. 
53 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522; Alderman, supra note 50, at 492–93; Kies, supra note 39, 
at 280–82. 
54 Alderman, supra note 50, at 495; Kies, supra note 39, at 280–81; see People v. Conk-
lin, 522 P.2d 1049, 1057 (Cal. 1974) (stating that the legislative history of the federal wire-
tapping statute “reveals that Congress intended that the states be allowed to enact more 
restrictive laws designed to protect the right of privacy”). 
55 See Commonwealth v. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d 963, 971 (Mass. 2001); Alderman, supra note 
50, app. 1, at 533–45 (categorizing all of the states’ types of wiretapping and eavesdropping 
statutes); Kies, supra note 39, at 280–81. 
56 See Kies, supra note 39, at 280–82; Triano, supra note 45, at 394. 
57 See Claiborne, supra note 39, at 499; Humphrey, supra note 41, at 781–82; Triano, 
supra note 45, at 394–95. 
58 See 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/14-1 to -3 (2012); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 272, § 99 
(2010); Triano, supra note 45, at 395. 
59 See 720 ILCS § 5/14-1 to -3; ch. 272, § 99; Triano, supra note 45, at 395. 
60 See Hyde, 750 N.E.2d at 965–66; Claiborne, supra note 39, at 493. 
61 See ACLU v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 605–06 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 651 
(2012); Hyde, 750 N.E.2d at 967–68, 971. 
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is no longer within the policy scope of protecting peoples’ privacy 
rights since no reasonable privacy interests exist when the conversation 
is open to the public.62 
B. The Massachusetts Wiretapping Statute 
 Prior to 1968, Massachusetts had a wiretapping law that required 
only the consent of one party to legally record a conversation.63 Out of 
a growing concern over the proliferation of devices capable of inter-
cepting wire and oral communications, however, the Massachusetts leg-
islature set up a special commission on electronic eavesdropping to 
create a stricter law.64 The legislature was particularly concerned about 
the potential invasion of privacy posed by these interception devices.65 
 As recommend by the commission’s report, the legislature passed 
amendments to the Massachusetts wiretapping statute that created a 
more stringent law.66 The statute now prohibits intentional interception 
of both private and public oral communication.67 Interception is de-
fined as “to secretly hear, secretly record, or aid another to secretly hear 
or secretly record the contents of any wire or oral communication 
through the use of any intercepting device by any person other than a 
person given prior authority by all parties to such communication . . . .”68 
The Massachusetts legislature therefore transformed its one-party con-
sent statute to an all-party consent statute that was strong enough to 
criminalize secret recordings of both private and public conversa-
tions.69 
 In Massachusetts, a recording is considered “secret” unless the re-
corded person has actual knowledge of the recording, which can be 
proven by objective manifestations.70 Whether there is an objective 
manifestation of knowledge turns on whether the person had notice of 
the recording.71 Therefore, by simply holding a known recording de-
                                                                                                                      
62 See ch. 272, § 99; Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 605–06; Hyde, 750 N.E.2d at 967–68. 
63 Hyde, 750 N.E.2d at 967; see 1959 Mass. Acts 400–02. 
64 Hyde, 750 N.E.2d at 966–67. 
65 Id. at 967. 
66 See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 272, § 99 (2010); Hyde, 750 N.E.2d at 966–67. 
67 See ch. 272, § 99; Hyde, 750 N.E.2d at 966. 
68 Ch. 272, § 99 (emphasis added); Hyde, 750 N.E.2d at 966. 
69 See 1968 Mass. Acts 632–44; Hyde, 750 N.E.2d at 966–68. 
70 Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 86–87 (1st Cir. 2011) (citing Commonwealth v. Jack-
son, 349 N.E.2d 337, 340 (Mass. 1976)); see Hyde, 750 N.E.2d at 967, 971. 
71 Glik, 655 F.3d at 86–87; Hyde, 750 N.E.2d at 967, 971. 
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vice in plain view of the person being recorded, the recording is no 
longer secret and does not violate the statute.72 
 Since the Supreme Judicial Court (“SJC”) has recognized that the 
Massachusetts wiretapping statute is carefully worded and unambigu-
ous, it has interpreted the statute by the plain meaning of its lan-
guage.73 Accordingly, since the statute lists various exceptions to the 
rule, the SJC will not read additional exceptions into the statute.74 
There is no exception in the statute for private citizens who secretly 
record on-duty public officials, and therefore it is illegal to secretly re-
cord an on-duty police officer, even if he is publicly using racially 
charged language and excessive or illegal force.75 
 The preamble of the Massachusetts wiretapping statute states that 
the intent of the statute is to protect the privacy of all citizens.76 Since 
the SJC looks solely at the plain language of the statute, however, there 
is actually no requirement that the conversation be private at all.77 
Thus, protecting public speech as well as private speech under the stat-
ute’s wide scope needlessly prohibits more than the statute’s asserted 
intent.78 While the SJC has recognized this inherent contradiction be-
tween the text of the statute and the preamble, it nevertheless has held 
that the plain language of the statute is the best indication of the legis-
lature’s ultimate policy goals.79 
                                                                                                                      
72 See Glik, 655 F.3d at 86–87; Hyde, 750 N.E.2d at 967, 971. 
73 Hyde, 750 N.E.2d at 966–67. 
74 Id. at 966; see Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 272, § 99 (2010). 
75 See ch. 272, § 99; Hyde, 750 N.E.2d at 966, 971. While it is illegal to surreptitiously re-
cord on-duty police officers, it should be noted that the First Circuit in Jean v. Mass. State 
Police held that disseminating illegally recorded materials was protected by the First 
Amendment. See 492 F.3d 24, 25 (1st Cir. 2007); Skehill, supra note 40, at 1002. While this 
decision properly recognizes that disseminating recordings of police misconduct is impor-
tant enough to the public to grant constitutional protections, it failed to recognize the act 
of recording the misconduct itself as having an equivalent amount of public importance. 
See Jean, 492 F.3d at 33; Skehill, supra note 40, at 1002. 
76 See ch. 272, § 99(A); Hyde, 750 N.E.2d at 967–68. In outlining the statute’s policy 
purpose, the preamble of the Massachusetts wiretapping statute states that “the uncon-
trolled development and unrestricted use of modern electronic surveillance devices pose 
grave dangers to the privacy of all citizens of the commonwealth. Therefore, the secret use 
of such devices by private individuals must be prohibited.” Ch. 272, § 99(A). The statute, 
however, does not require that an intercepted conversation have an expectation of privacy. 
See ch. 272, § 99(C)(1). 
77 See ch. 272, § 99; Hyde, 750 N.E.2d at 967–68. 
78 See ch. 272, § 99; Hyde, 750 N.E.2d at 967–68. 
79 See Hyde, 750 N.E.2d at 967–68. The court stated that: 
While [the court] recognize[s] that G.L. c. 272, § 99, was designed to prohibit 
the use of electronic surveillance devices by private individuals because of the 
serious threat they pose to the ‘privacy of all citizens,’ the plain language of 
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 In 2011, the First Circuit Court of Appeals questioned the Massa-
chusetts statute in Glik v. Cunniffe, but the decision fell short of declar-
ing the statute unconstitutional.80 The Glik case stems from an incident 
where the plaintiff, Glik, was arrested for openly recording the Boston 
police arresting another young man.81 Glik recorded the arrest taking 
place about ten feet from him because he felt the police were using ex-
cessive force, including punching the arrestee.82 After placing the other 
individual under arrest, the police confronted Glik, who then told the 
officers that he was video and audio recording the incident.83 The po-
lice arrested and booked Glik, then charged him with violating the 
Massachusetts wiretapping statute, disturbing the peace, and aiding in 
the escape of a prisoner.84 
 The criminal charges against Glik were subsequently dismissed, 
but Glik sued his arresting officers and the City of Boston for violating 
his First and Fourth Amendment rights, his state law civil rights, and for 
malicious prosecution.85 The decision in Glik ultimately fell on the issue 
of whether the officers were entitled to qualified immunity.86 The First 
Circuit held that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity 
since Glik had a clearly established right to openly film the police offi-
cers in a public space.87 The court reasoned that, while not unqualified, 
openly filming on-duty police officers in public was a safeguarded right 
under the First Amendment.88 
 The First Circuit in Glik, however, avoided a broad-sweeping re-
form of Massachusetts’s wiretapping law by clearly stating that the right 
to film is not without limitations nor is it unqualified.89 The court men-
tioned that the right to film is subject to reasonable restrictions, includ-
ing limitations on the “manner” of recording.90 Nevertheless, the court 
did not address the issue of surreptitious recordings nor did it specify as 
                                                                                                                      
the statute, which is the best indication of the Legislature’s ultimate intent, 
contains nothing that would protect, on the basis of privacy rights, the re-
cording that occurred here. 
Id. 
80 See Glik, 655 F.3d at 78, 85, 88. 
81 Id. at 79–80. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 80. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 79. 
87 Id. 
88 See id. at 84, 85. 
89 See id. 
90 Id. at 84. 
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to whether recording surreptitiously is a reasonable manner restric-
tion.91 Since Glik was recording the police openly and with notice, the 
court felt that it did not have the occasion to decide whether recording 
surreptitiously was a manner of recording also protected by the First 
Amendment, or whether that reasonably violated one’s privacy rights.92 
Thus, the Massachusetts statute that prohibits surreptitiously recording 
on-duty police officers still remains in effect.93 
C. Illinois Eavesdropping Statute 
 Prior to May 2012, the eavesdropping law in Illinois was much 
more restrictive than its Massachusetts counterpart.94 Like Massachu-
setts, Illinois’s statute requires all-party consent to legally record a con-
versation.95 Also like Massachusetts, the Illinois statute does not require 
that the parties have any expectation that their conversation be private; 
in fact, the statute expressly states that privacy is not a requirement.96 In 
addition, an individual found guilty of eavesdropping in Illinois faces 
fifteen years of imprisonment if the recorded party is an on-duty police 
officer, a sentence comparable to that for a second-degree murder con-
viction in the state.97 The Illinois eavesdropping statute further restricts 
                                                                                                                      
91 See id. 
92 See id. (stating that “the right to film is not without limitations. It may be subject to 
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions. We have no occasion to explore those 
limitations here, however”) (citations omitted). 
93 See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 272, § 99 (2010); Glik, 655 F.3d at 79, 85. 
94 See 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/14-1 to -3 (2012); ch. 272, § 99; Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 
586–87 (reasoning that the Illinois eavesdropping statute was likely too restrictive of First 
Amendment rights, in that it did not permit openly recording on-duty police officers); 
Kies, supra note 39, at 287 (recognizing the Illinois statute, in 2011, as “the most restrictive 
wiretapping law in the country”). 
95 See 720 ILCS § 5/14-2(a)(1); ch. 272, § 99(B)(4); Alderman, supra note 50, at 500, 
503. 
96 See 720 ILCS § 5/14-1(d); ch. 272, § 99; Alderman, supra note 50, at 500, 503. In 
1986, the Supreme Court of Illinois decided People v. Beardsley, which reversed an eaves-
dropping conviction. 503 N.E.2d 346, 352 (Ill. 1986); see Alderman, supra note 50, at 501–
02. The defendant had been arrested and placed in the back of the squad car, from where 
he secretly recorded a conversation between two police officers who sat in the front seats. 
Beardsley, 503 N.E.2d at 347–48. The Illinois Supreme Court interpreted the statute, calling 
for a requirement that the conversations have an expectation of privacy. Id. at 349–50. The 
Illinois legislature later revised the state’s eavesdropping statute to overturn the Beardsley 
decision by specifically defining a “conversation” as “any oral communication between 2 or 
more persons regardless of whether one or more parties intended their communication to 
be of a private nature . . . .” 720 ILCS § 5/14-1(d) (emphasis added); Hyde, 750 N.E.2d at 
970 n.10; Alderman, supra note 50, at 502. 
97 See 720 ILCS § 5/14-4; 730 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/5-4.5-30(a) (2012); Alvarez, 679 F.3d 
at 586; Claiborne, supra note 39, at 490–91. 
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recording conversations by not limiting the prohibition to surreptitious 
recordings.98 While an individual in Massachusetts may legally record 
his own conversation with the police as long as he provides notice, an 
individual in Illinois, until recently, was still breaking the law even if he 
were openly recording his own interaction with the police officer.99 
 The Seventh Circuit’s decision in ACLU of Illinois v. Alvarez drasti-
cally changed the scope of Illinois’s eavesdropping statute.100 In May 
2012, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of Illinois won an 
injunction limiting the enforcement of the statute.101 The case grew out 
of the ACLU’s intent to begin a police accountability program where its 
members would openly make audio-visual recordings of police officers 
at demonstrations without the officers’ consent.102 Under the ACLU’s 
plan, members would only openly record the police when the officers 
were: (1) performing their public duties, (2) while in a public place, 
(3) while speaking at a volume audible to the unassisted human ear, 
and (4) in a manner where the recording was otherwise lawful.103 
 Because it feared that its members would be arrested and prose-
cuted for carrying out the intended program, the ACLU filed a lawsuit 
against Anita Alvarez, the Cook County State’s Attorney, seeking de-
claratory and injunctive relief against enforcement of Illinois’s eaves-
dropping statute.104 The ACLU challenged the statute’s constitutional-
ity based on a violation of the First Amendment’s guarantee of rights to 
free speech and free press.105 The Seventh Circuit agreed with the 
ACLU, stating that the eavesdropping statute does in fact “restrict[] a 
medium of expression—the use of a common instrument of communi-
cation—and thus an integral step in the speech process.”106 The court 
found that as applied to the program the ACLU was seeking to carry 
out, the statute interfered with both rights to free speech and free 
press.107 
 After finding that the eavesdropping statute did in fact restrict First 
Amendment rights, the Seventh Circuit then analyzed the statute under 
intermediate scrutiny to ascertain whether the law represented a rea-
                                                                                                                      
98 See 720 ILCS § 5/14-1 to -3; Alderman, supra note 50, at 502. 
99 See Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 605–06; Glik, 655 F.3d at 86–87. 
100 See 679 F.3d, at 586–87; Triano, supra note 45, at 404. 
101 Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 583, 586. 
102 Id. at 588. 
103 Id. 
104 See id. at 586. 
105 Id. at 588. 
106 Id. at 600. 
107 Id. 
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sonable means to protect privacy.108 The court noted that when police 
officers are performing their duties in public places and speaking at 
volumes audible to bystanders, there are simply no privacy concerns 
that the government could be seeking to protect.109 
 The Seventh Circuit, however, made a distinction between the 
ACLU’s program of openly recording police officers and surreptitiously 
recording private conversations.110 The court suggested that the differ-
ence between recording openly or surreptitiously could potentially 
change whether a privacy interest existed, and thus whether the state 
had a legitimate interest in protecting it.111 The ultimate holding of the 
case only applies to openly recording on-duty police officers; therefore, 
surreptitiously recording on-duty police officers in Illinois is still ille-
gal.112 Furthermore, since the court did not address the effect that all-
party consent has on surreptitious recordings, it remains illegal in Illi-
nois to surreptitiously record your own conversations with a police offi-
cer, even in a private setting.113 
II. A Deeply Ingrained Culture of Police Abuse  
for People of Color 
 Police misconduct is still pervasive throughout the United States, 
particularly with respect to racial minorities.114 Recent evidence dem-
                                                                                                                      
108 See id. at 604–06. The court used an intermediate scrutiny standard since the law 
imposed a content-neutral restriction. See id. at 586. 
109 See id. at 606–07. 
110 See id. at 605–06. 
111 See id. (stating that, “surreptitiously accessing the private communications of another 
. . . clearly implicates recognized privacy expectations . . . ,” but that these privacy interests 
are not at issue since “[t]he ACLU wants to openly audio record police officers . . . .”) (em-
phasis added). 
112 See id. at 586, 608. 
113 See 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/14-1 to -3 (2012); Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 608; Triano, su-
pra note 45, at 395. 
114 See David A. Harris, American Civil Liberties Union, Driving While Black: 
Racial Profiling on Our Nation’s Highways 14–26 (1999), available at http://www. 
aclu.org/racial-justice/driving-while-black-racial-profiling-our-nations-highways (referring 
to dozens of cases throughout the United States of the racial profiling of drivers); Anthony 
Punt, Occupy Movement Shines Light on Systematic Police Brutality, Policymic (Nov. 23, 2011), 
http://www.policymic.com/articles/2549/occupy-movement-shines-light-on-systematic-
police-brutality (mentioning that the recent Occupy Movement has exposed systematic 
police brutality against protesters in the United States); DOJ Investigating 17 Police, Sheriff 
Departments, CBS News (Apr. 18, 2012), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505263_162-5741 
5638/doj-investigating-17-police-sheriff-departments/ [hereinafter DOJ Investigating De-
partments] (stating that there are more investigations of police departments for civil rights 
violations than ever before). 
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onstrates a need to change the law so as to provide additional safe-
guards against this misconduct.115 The widespread police misconduct 
that took place across the country at “Occupy Wall Street” demonstra-
tions shows how many police departments still commit blatant acts of 
brutality against innocent people.116 In addition, the culture of police 
misconduct, which is prevalent in police departments throughout the 
United States, often takes the form of racist police practices.117 Recent 
DOJ investigations of various police departments shed light on this un-
fortunate reality.118 
A. “Occupy” Protests Expose Systematic Police Brutality 
 The Occupy Wall Street protests began in September of 2011 and 
eventually drew wide media attention.119 The demonstration’s purpose 
was to take a stand against what protesters saw as corporate greed and 
corruption perpetuated by America’s wealthiest one percent.120 With 
their populist slogan of “We are the 99%,” the protests evolved into a 
national “Occupy” movement with similar demonstrations springing up 
throughout dozens of U.S. cities and college campuses.121 While the 
ultimate success of the Occupy movement has been marginal at best, 
                                                                                                                      
115 See Skehill, supra note 40, at 1003–04; Punt, supra note 114; Seattle Times Staff, su-
pra note 4. 
116 See Eric W. Dolan, Lawrence O’Donnell Rips ‘Unprovoked Police Brutality’ at ‘Occupy Wall 
Street,’ Raw Story (Sept. 26, 2011), http://www.rawstory.com/rawreplay/2011/09/lawrence- 
odonnell-rips-unprovoked-police-brutality-at-occupy-wall-street/; Punt, supra note 114. 
117 See Harris, supra note 114, at 14–26; Floyd D. Weatherspoon, Racial Profiling of Afri-
can-American Males: Stopped, Searched, and Stripped of Constitutional Protection, 38 J. Marshall 
L. Rev. 439, 442 (2004); DOJ Investigating Departments, supra note 114. 
118 See Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Civil 
Rights Div., to Bill Montgomery, County Attorney, Maricopa County, at 4 (Dec. 15, 2011), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/mcso_findletter_12-15-11.pdf 
[hereinafter MCSO Investigation] (discussing the United States’ investigation of the Mari-
copa County Sheriff’s Office); Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t 
of Justice, Civil Rights Div., to Joseph Maturo, Jr., Mayor, Town of East Haven, at 2–3 (Dec. 19, 
2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/easthaven_findletter_ 
12-19-11.pdf [hereinafter EHPD Investigation] (detailing investigation of the East Haven 
Police Department); DOJ Investigating Departments, supra note 114. 
119 See Occupy Movement (Occupy Wall Street), N.Y. Times, http://topics.nytimes.com/ 
top/reference/timestopics/organizations/o/occupy_wall_street/index.html?8qa (last up-
dated Sept. 17, 2012) [hereinafter Occupy Movement]. 
120 Occupy Movement, supra note 119; Occupy Wall Street, About, http://occupywallst. 
org/about/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2014). 
121 Occupy Movement, supra note 119. 
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the demonstrations became well known for exposing police brutality 
throughout the country.122 
 There were several incidents of police brutality at Occupy demon-
strations across the country involving the unprovoked use of pepper 
spray against peaceful protesters.123 At an “Occupy Cal” demonstration 
at the University of California, Davis, campus police officer Lt. John 
Pike infamously doused protesters with pepper spray without any 
provocation as they sat peacefully in the quad.124 One of Lt. Pike’s vic-
tims even had to be transported to the hospital to be treated for chemi-
cal burns.125 In Seattle, police pepper sprayed peaceful protesters, in-
cluding a priest, a pregnant teenager, and an eighty-four-year-old 
woman.126 In New York City, one videographer captured a high-ranking 
officer approach a group of female protesters, immediately pepper-
spray them with absolutely no provocation, and then casually walk 
                                                                                                                      
122 See Occupy Movement, supra note 119; Punt, supra note 114. While the movement at 
its peak produced a huge amount of media attention, the ultimate success of the move-
ment in implementing policy changes was largely hindered by a lack of leadership struc-
ture to effectively engage in political discourse. Occupy Movement, supra note 119; Punt, 
supra note 114. Furthermore, not only was the movement hindered from achieving its 
goals by the absence of a leadership structure, but the goals of the movement itself were 
somewhat up for debate. See Occupy Movement, supra note 119; Occupy Wall Street, supra 
note 120 (referencing various documents “well received by the movement” but lacking an 
agreed upon platform). 
123 See Dolan, supra note 116; Punt, supra note 114. 
124 See Jason Cherkis, UC Davis Police Pepper-Spray Seated Students in Occupy Dispute 
(VIDEO) (UPDATES), Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/11/19/uc-
davis-police-pepper-spray-students_n_1102728.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2014); Punt, supra 
note 114. While several people took footage of this incident, arguably the most famous was 
recorded by Thomas Fowler and can be seen on YouTube. See Cherkis, supra; Thomas 
Fowler, Police Pepper Spraying and Arresting Students at UC Davis, YouTube (Nov. 18, 2011), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WmJmmnMkuEM. 
125 See Cherkis, supra note 124. 
126 See Maura Judkis, Occupy’s 84-Year-Old Pepper Spray Victim: Is This the Most Iconic Image 
of the Movement?, Wash. Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/arts-post/post/ 
occupys-84-year-old-pepper-spray-victim-is-this-the-most-iconic-image-of-the-movement/ 
2011/11/16/gIQAzateRN_blog.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2014). To view the haunting 
picture of the 84-year-old community activist, Dorli Rainey, after being pepper-sprayed by 
the police, visit the Judkis article cited. Id. Since the Occupy Seattle protests coincided with 
the DOJ’s investigation into the Seattle Police Department for civil rights violations, the 
DOJ specifically noted these recent incidents involving pepper spray (or Oleoresin Capsi-
cum spray). See SPD Investigation, supra note 15, at 5. While these incidents at Occupy 
Seattle were outside the scope of the DOJ’s investigation, they were noted, in part, because 
of prior criticism of the SPD in mishandling the World Trade Organization demonstra-
tions in 1999. See id. 
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away.127 These incidents are just a few examples of how the police used 
brutal tactics against the Occupy demonstrators.128 
 The reason the Occupy movement became associated with police 
brutality can largely be attributed to the increased ability to capture 
video and pictures and to disseminate them on social networking plat-
forms.129 Videos and photos widely viewed on social networking sites 
like Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube were frequently picked up by na-
tional media outlets, where they received even greater attention.130 
 The Occupy movement exposed several police departments’ sys-
tematic abuse of nonviolent protesters.131 The openness of this brutality 
against peaceful protesters in the presence of other police officers and 
hundreds of camera-wielding witnesses demonstrates that there is a cul-
ture of acceptance for this type of behavior in police departments.132 
Had the officers felt threatened by punishment, they likely would not 
have openly used excessive force in front of their co-workers or numer-
ous cameras.133 
B. Police Misconduct in the Form of Racist Police Practices 
 In addition to excessive force, police misconduct often comes in 
the form of racial profiling.134 Racial profiling is the discriminatory 
practice utilized by law enforcement to target certain individuals based 
on their race, ethnicity, or national origin for suspicion of a crime.135 
An underlying presumption of racial profiling is that persons of color 
are more likely to commit crimes, thus law enforcement should target 
                                                                                                                      
127 See Dolan, supra note 116 (incorporating a video depicting the incident). 
128 See Jason Cherkis, Occupy Wall Street: Video Allegedly Shows NYPD Officer Striking Protest-
ers with Baton (Photos), Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/10/05/ 
occupy-wall-street-nypd-police-brutality-video_n_997414.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2014) 
(describing and showing video footage of NYPD officers attacking Occupy demonstrators 
with batons); Punt, supra note 114. 
129 See Occupy Movement, supra note 119; Punt, supra note 114. 
130 See Occupy Movement, supra note 119; Punt, supra note 114. 
131 See Punt, supra note 114. 
132 See Dina Mishra, Comment, Undermining Excessive Privacy for Police: Citizen Tape Re-
cording to Check Police Officers’ Power, 117 Yale L.J. 1549, 1554 (2008); Skehill, supra note 40, 
at 1003; SPD Investigation, supra note 15, at 27 (noting that an officer’s “failure to imme-
diately report [misconduct] could be seen as a reflection of a hardened culture” of accep-
tance to that kind of behavior); Dolan, supra note 116. 
133 See Mishra, supra note 132, at 1554; Skehill, supra note 40, at 1003; SPD Investiga-
tion, supra note 15, at 27; Dolan, supra note 116. 
134 See Harris, supra note 114, at 5, 14; Weatherspoon, supra note 117, at 442. 
135 See Lupe S. Salinas & Fernando Colon-Navarro, Racial Profiling as a Means of Thwart-
ing the Alleged Latino Security Threat, 37 T. Marshall L. Rev. 5, 8 (2011); Weatherspoon, 
supra note 117, at 442. 
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those minority groups in order to most effectively fight crime, particu-
larly drug related crime.136 Although the underlying premise of racial 
profiling is factually untrue, the over-surveillance of minorities leads to 
somewhat of a self-fulfilling prophecy.137 For example, since police stop 
and search African Americans and Latinos more often for drugs, they 
end up quantitatively finding drugs more often on members of these 
groups than on white Americans.138 
 Racial profiling not only results in more frequent punishment of 
minorities within the criminal justice system, but also severely harms 
entire communities.139 When police target people for no reason other 
than race, it leaves many in the community feeling stigmatized, ostra-
cized, humiliated, and less willing to cooperate with authorities.140 Ul-
timately, racial profiling undermines both the faith in the perceived 
fairness of the justice system, as well as constitutional principles the sys-
tem is meant to uphold.141 
 As addressed earlier, New York City has implemented a “Stop-and-
Frisk” program resulting in police stopping hundreds of thousands of 
New Yorkers each year.142 The program has been criticized for its ra-
cially biased application and for leading to excessive use of force.143 In 
2011, the New York Police Department (NYPD) performed 680,000 
stops; more than eighty percent of which were performed on blacks 
and Latinos.144 The police also used physical force in more than twenty 
percent of the stops.145 In the West Bronx, physical force was used in 
over forty percent of the stops, yet the increased amount of force did 
not translate proportionally into higher arrest rates, leading to ques-
tions as to why force was used in the first place.146 These statistics, as 
well as stories like Alvin’s, help to explain why black and Latino com-
                                                                                                                      
136 See Harris, supra note 114, at 5, 11; Weatherspoon, supra note 117, at 442. 
137 See Harris, supra note 114, at 5, 11; Robert L. Carter, Discrimination in the New York 
Criminal Justice System, 3 N.Y. City L. Rev. 267, 271–72 (2000). 
138 See Harris, supra note 114, at 5, 11; Carter, supra note 137, at 271–72. 
139 See Harris, supra note 114, at 5; Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Crime Mapping and the 
Fourth Amendment: Redrawing “High-Crime Areas”, 63 Hastings L.J. 179, 217 (2011). 
140 See Harris, supra note 114, at 5, 37; Ferguson, supra note 139, at 216–17. 
141 See Harris, supra note 114, at 5, 37; Ferguson, supra note 139, at 217. 
142 Rivera, supra note 31, at A17. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. 
146 See id. After the New York Times made this finding regarding the use of force, police 
officials down-played the issue by contending that officers were over-reporting force in that 
they described basic frisks or guiding suspects to the sidewalk as “hands on suspect,” which 
was not required. Id. 
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munities in New York City distrust and feel alienated by those who are 
supposed to protect them.147 
 Nowhere is racial profiling seen more clearly than in traffic stops 
executed by police.148 The acronym DWB, standing for “Driving While 
Black/Brown,” is a commonly used adage referring to when police stop 
individuals solely on the basis of their race.149 The racial profiling of 
drivers is pervasive in both large and small police departments across 
the United States.150 
 Studies looking at the number of encounters and arrests the police 
make are not completely consistent with an existence of racially biased 
policing.151 Some studies have shown no racial differences, while others 
demonstrate substantial racial disparities.152 It should be noted, how-
ever, that the data on racial demographics of those who have encoun-
ters with police is collected by the very same police officers that the 
data would incriminate as acting racially biased, thus leading to poten-
tially false data collection.153 What is clear, though, is that many people 
in minority communities often feel that they are being racially profiled 
                                                                                                                      
147 See Tuttle & Schneider, supra note 17; Editorial, Stop-and-Frisk in New York City, N.Y. 
Times, Aug. 9, 2012, at A22, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/09/opinion/ 
stop-and-frisk-in-new-york-city.html?_r=0. The court in Floyd v. City of New York also noted 
those who were subjected to the NYPD’s stop-and-frisk program felt unwelcome in parts of 
the city and distrusted police. 2013 WL 4046209, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2013). 
148 See Harris, supra note 114, at 5; Weatherspoon, supra note 117, at 451. 
149 See Robert D. Crutchfield et al., Racial and Ethnic Disparity and Criminal Justice: How 
Much Is Too Much?, 100 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 903, 920 (2010); Weatherspoon, supra 
note 117, at 440. 
150 See Harris, supra note 114, at 14–26 (detailing numerous examples from twenty-
four different states of drivers being racially profiled). 
151 See Crutchfield et al., supra note 149, at 904. 
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153 See Floyd, 2013 WL 4046209, at *4 (noting the central flaw in the database of re-
corded stop-and-frisks performed by the NYPD is that the officers control the record and 
skew the number of unconstitutional stops that occur); Dasha Kabakova, Note, The Lack of 
Accountability for the New York Police Department’s Investigative Stops, 10 Cardozo Pub. L. 
Pol’y & Ethics J. 539, 547–48 (2012) (noting that NYPD officers are required to fill out a 
“Stop, Question and Frisk Report Worksheet,” which includes recording the individual’s 
description, after conducting a stop); see also Complaint, supra note 1, at 3, 6 (mentioning 
that after the plaintiff was threatened with racially charged language and then stomped on 
by two different Seattle police officers, none of the several officers that witnessed or par-
took in the incident reported the use of force or other misconduct); Harris, supra note 
114, at 21 (describing an incident where officers in New Jersey were indicted for falsely 
recording black motorists as white); EHPD Investigation, supra note 118, at 3 (reporting 
findings that included police officers failing to collect and report traffic stop data in order 
to cover up the intentional disparate treatment of Latino drivers). 
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and that police brutality is widespread, or have experienced such abuse 
firsthand.154 
C. DOJ Investigations Shed More Light on the Culture of Racist Policing 
 Assistant Attorney General Thomas E. Perez has led the Civil 
Rights Division of the DOJ to investigate more major police and sher-
iff’s departments for discriminatory patterns and practices than ever 
before.155 While these investigations are often sparked by isolated inci-
dents of misconduct, they have exposed several police departments for 
harboring a culture of racially discriminatory practices.156 The conclu-
sions of these investigations provide further evidence that racist polic-
ing is not just carried out by “a few bad apples,” but rather that it is a 
pervasive issue that must be addressed.157 
1. Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office 
 In March of 2009, the DOJ formally began an investigation into 
the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office (“MCSO”) in Arizona, which is 
led by the infamous Sheriff Joe Arpaio.158 The investigation was aimed 
at uncovering racially discriminatory practices in violation of the Con-
stitution.159 What the DOJ found was that the MCSO was engaging in 
unconstitutional police practices that not only included racial discrimi-
                                                                                                                      
154 See Carter, supra note 137, at 276; Tuttle & Schneider, supra note 17. 
155 See DOJ Investigating Departments, supra note 114. 
156 See id.; Seattle Times Staff, supra note 4; EHPD Investigation, supra note 118, at 2–3. 
157 See Harris, supra note 114, at 14–26 (referencing incidents of racial profiling 
throughout the United States). Compare DOJ Investigating Departments, supra note 114 (im-
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supra note 118, at 2 (finding that a culture of discriminatory policing was “deeply rooted” 
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[the] MCSO”), and Punt, supra note 114 (arguing that Occupy movement exposed system-
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158 See MCSO Investigation, supra note 118, at 1, 5. An initial inquiry into the Maricopa 
County Sheriff’s Office began in June of 2008. Id. at 1. After the investigation formally 
began in March 2009, the MCSO repeatedly refused to cooperate with the DOJ by not 
providing pertinent information. Id. at 1 n.1. It was not until after the United States filed a 
lawsuit against the MCSO that all the information was provided in June 2011 under a 
court-enforceable agreement. Id. at 5. When asked what he thought about the investiga-
tion into discriminatory practices of his office against Latinos, Sheriff Arpaio responded, 
“I’m not a social worker. I’m a cop . . . .” DOJ Investigating Departments, supra note 114 (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted). 
159 See MCSO Investigation, supra note 118, at 1. 
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nation, but also a number of incidents involving excessive force against 
Latinos.160 
 Most startling about the DOJ’s findings is that the discriminatory 
treatment of Latinos was not the product of a few rogue officers, but 
rather stemmed from a culture of bias against Latinos within the 
MCSO.161 The DOJ found that the discriminatory culture was well in-
grained into the agency and perpetuated by Sheriff Arpaio himself.162 
Arpaio was found to have nurtured the culture of bias against Latinos 
by endorsing and distributing racially charged constituent letters.163 
Despite the letters not containing any meaningful descriptions of 
criminal activity—rather, just crude, derogatory language about Lati-
nos—Arpaio would treat them as relevant intelligence and directed his 
staff to further investigate the information.164 
2. New Orleans Police Department 
 In May 2010, the mayor of New Orleans sought the DOJ’s assis-
tance to transform the New Orleans Police Department (“NOPD”) so 
that it would comport with constitutional requirements.165 Soon there-
after, the DOJ initiated an investigation that uncovered startling dis-
parities in the department’s treatment of whites and African Ameri-
cans.166 The DOJ found that while nationally African Americans under 
age seventeen were three times as likely to be arrested for a serious 
crime, in New Orleans, this jumped to sixteen times more likely.167 
                                                                                                                      
160 Id. at 2. The investigation found discriminatory police practices which included 
performing traffic stops on Latino drivers four to nine times more often than similarly 
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 In addition, the data on use of force exposed incredibly disparate 
treatment towards African Americans.168 The DOJ found that eighty-
four percent of those subjected to force in resisting arrest reports were 
African American.169 Also, between January 2009 and May 2010, of the 
27 incidents where a NOPD officer intentionally discharged his firearm 
at someone, all of those subjected to the deadly force were African 
American.170 
 The DOJ ultimately found that the NOPD had in fact been system-
atically violating the Constitution.171 The DOJ concluded that the 
NOPD had deeply rooted problems involving the excessive use of force, 
unconstitutional stops, searches, and arrests, and practiced racially dis-
criminatory policing.172 
3. East Haven Police Department 
 In September 2009, after receiving several complaints that police 
were harassing Latino residents in the small town of East Haven, Con-
necticut, the DOJ launched an investigation into possible racially dis-
criminatory practices.173 This was not the first time the town of East Ha-
ven dealt with concerns about race relations.174 In 1997, an East Haven 
police officer shot an unarmed black motorist suspected of speeding 
four times at close range in somewhat suspicious circumstances.175 
More recently, in April 2012, four officers were indicted on federal 
charges stemming from abuses against those in the Latino commu-
nity.176 When the mayor of East Haven, Joseph Maturo Jr., was asked 
what he’d do for the Latino community in light of the allegations 
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against his town’s officers, he responded, “I might have tacos when I go 
home. I’m not sure yet.”177 
 With a mayor like Maturo Jr., who has the power to appoint the 
chief of police, it may not have been such a surprise that the DOJ’s in-
vestigation into the town’s police practices revealed a “deeply rooted” 
culture of racist policing.178 The DOJ found that the East Haven Police 
Department systematically engaged in discriminatory policing by inten-
tionally targeting Latinos for traffic stops, treating Latino drivers more 
harshly after being stopped, and then intentionally failing to design 
and implement a system to track this kind of misconduct.179 
* * * 
 These examples and statistics reveal that not only is police miscon-
duct prevalent in the United States, but that it often takes the form of 
racist police practices.180 These practices are more than just isolated 
incidents involving a rogue officer, but rather are deeply ingrained in 
the culture of the departments.181 While surely not every officer par-
takes in overt misconduct within the departments where such a culture 
exists, several officers knowingly allow the misconduct to happen, 
which equally harms the communities they are sworn to protect.182 This 
culture of racial discrimination helps demonstrate why the public 
should have every safeguard at its disposal to combat this misconduct, 
including the right to surreptitiously record on-duty police officers.183 
III. Historical Effectiveness of Surreptitious Recordings in 
Raising Awareness & Curbing Police Misconduct 
 There are several benefits to allowing the recording of on-duty po-
lice conduct.184 Whether taken surreptitiously or openly, such videos 
have the power to turn public attention towards police misconduct and 
initiate change.185 These recordings increase efficiency in the admini-
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stration of justice, promote police accountability, and act as a safeguard 
against police misconduct.186 Because surreptitious recordings have 
previously proven to be an effective safeguard against racist police prac-
tices, the right to secretly record must be protected.187 
A. The Benefits of Video Recordings 
 A simple search on Google or YouTube for “police brutality” will 
bring up more stories and videos than one can imagine.188 Many of 
these videos depicting police misconduct are recorded by bystanders 
on cell phone cameras.189 The advent and proliferation of cell phone 
cameras makes recording on-duty police officers much easier for the 
average citizen.190 Smart phones equipped with cameras also simplify 
the worldwide distribution of those videos.191 Many cell phones have 
the capability to upload the footage directly from the phone to a web-
site such as YouTube or Facebook.192 
 The fact that recording police misconduct is becoming more 
common helps demonstrate that police misconduct is still prevalent in 
today’s society.193 In addition, many of the major police brutality stories 
that have gained media attention are those accompanied by video foot-
age of the incident.194 Sometimes the video footage is from the police 
officer’s own recording device, such as one mounted in their cars, but 
often the footage is shot by a bystander, usually with a cell phone.195 
 Because recordings of police brutality surface regularly on the 
news and internet, it is vital that this power to capture video of police 
                                                                                                                      
186 See Kies, supra note 39, at 302–03; Skehill, supra note 40, at 1003–04. 
187 See Commonwealth v. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d 963, 971–72 (Mass. 2001) (Marshall, C.J., 
dissenting); Skehill, supra note 40, at 999–1000, 1003–04; Seattle Times Staff, supra note 4. 
188 See Claiborne, supra note 39, at 494. Google search for “police brutality” videos 
yielded about 10,900,000 results. Google, https://www.google.com (last visited Feb. 11, 
2014). YouTube search for “police brutality” yielded about 503,000 results. YouTube, 
http://www.youtube.com (last visited Feb. 11, 2014). 
189 See Alderman, supra note 50, at 488. 
190 See Steven A. Lautt, Note, Sunlight Is Still the Best Disinfectant: The Case for a First 
Amendment Right to Record the Police, 51 Washburn L.J. 349, 349–50 (2012); Skehill, supra 
note 40, at 985. 
191 See Lautt, supra note 190, at 349–50; Skehill, supra note 40, at 985. 
192 See Lautt, supra note 190, at 350; Skehill, supra note 40, at 985; Triano, supra note 
45, at 390. 
193 See Skehill, supra note 40, at 985, 1003; SPD Investigation, supra note 15, at 3. 
194 See Skehill, supra note 40, at 998–1000; Seattle Times Staff, supra note 4. 
195 See Alderman, supra note 50, at 488 (describing the cell phone videos depicting the 
killing of twenty-two-year-old Oscar Grant by a Bay Area Rapid Transit police officer); Ske-
hill, supra note 40, at 985; Seattle Times Staff, supra note 4. 
218 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 34:195 
misconduct remains in the hands of all citizens.196 While the police of-
ten record their own actions for liability purposes, when the liability 
falls upon the officer, the videos can sometimes go missing.197 Police 
are capable of turning off their cameras or recording over the footage, 
therefore, it is important that citizens can collect independent video of 
a controversial incident.198 
 In 2007, for example, an investigative reporter for a Washington, 
D.C. television station was pulled over by seven county police cars 
while she was doing a story on the misuse of public funds.199 She 
claimed that the police used excessive force which resulted in a dislo-
cated shoulder and torn rotator cuff.200 Despite winning a settlement 
from her subsequent lawsuit, she never obtained any video from the 
officers’ dashboard cameras.201 The county officials maintained that 
there was no video at the time of the incident because, coincidentally, 
all seven of the dashboard cameras had simultaneously malfunc-
tioned.202 
 By their very nature, recordings depict exactly what happened, 
often making them the best and most accurate evidence of an event.203 
Recordings are able to portray events in ways a witness’s testimony sim-
ply cannot—free of any bias, lies, or bad memory.204 Both video and 
audio recordings have proven incredibly useful in criminal and civil 
cases involving police officers.205 By providing proof as to what exactly 
occurred, video or audio recordings can protect police from frivolous 
claims of abuse as well as protect the victims of police brutality.206 Also, 
because juries tend to believe a police officer’s word over that of private 
citizens, a recording helps to ensure that they reach proper verdicts.207 
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 Police misconduct is often viewed as symbolically worse than typi-
cal law violations by civilians because it is carried out on behalf of all 
citizens under the guise of government authority.208 Therefore, ensur-
ing that police are held accountable for their actions is extremely im-
portant in maintaining the legitimacy of law enforcement.209 Since the 
police wield an extraordinary amount of power over all citizens, ensur-
ing that they are held accountable when they abuse that power is an 
interest shared by all citizens.210 
 Furthermore, there is some indication that the possibility of being 
recorded may change police behavior.211 If police know that their ac-
tions are subject to recording, “they will be more likely to act in full ac-
cordance with the law . . . .”212 Therefore, the proliferation of cell 
phone cameras combined with the freedom to surreptitiously record 
on-duty police officers has the potential to decrease police miscon-
duct.213 
B. Surreptitious Videos That Sparked Change in Police Conduct 
 The primary goals behind allowing surreptitious recordings of on-
duty police officers are to promote the efficient administration of jus-
tice, promote police accountability, and to safeguard the public from 
police misconduct.214 While there are other safeguards in place, such as 
the Exclusionary Rule and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the ability to record the 
actual event can allow people to accurately and convincingly substanti-
ate any of their claims of police misconduct.215 Two such examples of 
surreptitious recordings have been successful at just that, leading to 
major changes in both the Los Angeles and Seattle police depart-
ments.216 
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1. George Holliday’s Infamous Recording of the Rodney King Attack 
 The most infamous surreptitiously recorded video of on-duty po-
lice misconduct was filmed by George Holliday early in the morning of 
March 3, 1991.217 Holliday was awoken by noise outside his apartment 
and decided to videotape what he saw.218 He captured on video the 
ruthless beating of Rodney King by several police officers in Los Ange-
les.219 The video of the horrifying incident was seen all over the country 
and sparked a national debate on police brutality and racist prac-
tices.220 
 Despite the blatant evidence of police wrongdoing captured by 
Holliday, four of the involved officers were acquitted of assault with a 
deadly weapon and excessive force charges.221 The United States then 
saw some of the worst riots in the nation’s history in response to the 
officers’ acquittals.222 The videotape of the beating, however, was in-
strumental in obtaining subsequent convictions for two of the officers 
in federal court.223 
 The surreptitiously recorded video of Rodney King’s assault by the 
Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) not only exposed the reality of 
police brutality to many Americans, but also brought about reform in 
police training and discipline.224 Specifically, an independent commis-
sion was charged with investigating the practices of LAPD officers and 
implementing necessary changes.225 The commission, called the Chris-
topher Commission, instituted an early intervention system promoting 
improved officer discipline and early identification of problematic offi-
cers.226 The reforms also focused on moving policing tactics from a 
“suppression” model to a “community-policing” model, which is in-
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tended to foster more cooperation between the police and the pub-
lic.227 
 When all was said and done, George Holliday was praised for ex-
posing the horrendous actions by the LAPD, rather than punished as a 
criminal for surreptitiously recording the incident.228 Had there been 
laws discouraging him from secretly recording the police that beat Mr. 
King, like the wiretapping laws in Massachusetts or Illinois, the much 
needed reforms in the LAPD may never have been initiated.229 
2. Recordings Spark DOJ Investigation into SPD Civil Rights Violations 
 The DOJ began an investigation of the SPD after several videos of 
Seattle police officers using excessive force surfaced.230 The surrepti-
tiously filmed video of Martin Monetti Jr. being stomped on and sub-
jected to overtly racist threats, discussed above, was cited as particularly 
troubling in the DOJ’s report.231 
 The DOJ’s findings included that the “SPD engages in a pattern or 
practice of using unnecessary or excessive force, in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment . . . .”232 The findings were based on hundreds of 
hours of videos, voluminous documents, police reports, policy manuals, 
and SPD records regarding its use of force and policing practices.233 
The investigation also discovered that in approximately twenty percent 
of the instances in which SPD officers used force, they did so in an un-
constitutional manner.234 In particular, SPD officers resorted to the use 
of impact weapons too quickly, and fifty-seven percent of the time ba-
tons were used, they were either unnecessary or excessive.235 
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 While the DOJ was unable to make a finding of discriminatory po-
licing reaching the level of unconstitutionality, they did note serious 
concerns about how the other unconstitutional practices of the SPD 
were disproportionally impacting minority communities.236 The DOJ’s 
investigation revealed that over fifty percent of cases found to involve 
unnecessary or excessive force were committed against minorities.237 In 
addition, numerous individuals reported the police’s use of racially 
charged language and recalled being singled out because of their 
race.238 The infamous incident involving Mr. Monetti Jr. also suggested 
the department’s culture of acceptance regarding the use of overtly 
racist language, since the surrounding officers had no reaction to the 
racially charged threat.239 
 After the investigation deemed the SPD’s behavior unconstitu-
tional, the City of Seattle entered into a settlement agreement with the 
DOJ.240 The city was forced to implement changes in its policing prac-
tices related to the excessive use of force and biased policing.241 
Merrick Bobb, who served as the Deputy General Counsel on the 
Christopher Commission investing the LAPD after the Rodney King 
beating, was appointed by a U.S. District Court judge to oversee the 
reforms.242 The City of Seattle has now implemented what it is calling 
the “20/20” plan, where twenty policing reform initiatives are imple-
mented over twenty months.243 The initiatives are aimed at changing 
police recruitment training, transparency, community outreach, and 
data collection.244 
 Had it been illegal in Washington to surreptitiously record the of-
ficers threatening and stomping on Mr. Monetti Jr., it is possible that 
the recording, which helped spark much needed reforms of the SPD’s 
unconstitutional practices, would have never been made.245 Luckily, the 
power of recording on-duty police officers surreptitiously was protected 
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both here and in the case of Rodney King.246 These examples prove 
that the ability to record surreptitiously is an effective safeguard against 
police misconduct.247 
IV. Ensuring That the Right to Record Is Protected 
 As the court in Floyd v. City of New York noted, “[f]ostering trust and 
confidence between the police and the community would be an im-
provement for everyone.”248 In order to fully safeguard citizens from 
police misconduct, it is vital that people are legally permitted to surrep-
titiously record on-duty police officers.249 Because Massachusetts and 
Illinois are the only states that do not currently permit people to sur-
reptitiously record on-duty police, changes in the law should be made 
in those states.250 While the law in both Massachusetts and Illinois has 
been moving in the direction of permitting surreptitious recordings of 
the police in recent years, it is well past the time for the laws barring 
such recordings to be abolished.251 Legislatures in Massachusetts and 
Illinois should adopt exceptions to their wiretapping and eavesdrop-
ping laws that allow for secretly recording on-duty police officers.252 
A. Courts Protecting the Right to Record 
 One option to abolish the laws preventing surreptitious recordings 
of the police is to have courts, either federal or state, hold the laws un-
constitutional on First Amendment grounds.253 While the reasoning of 
the courts in Glik and Alvarez suggests that this is a viable option, those 
courts were hesitant to directly confront the wiretapping laws with re-
gards to surreptitious recordings.254 Since the courts in those cases 
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chose to exercise judicial restraint in protecting First Amendment 
rights, a binding decision overturning the wiretapping laws on constitu-
tional grounds has yet to occur.255 
 One benefit to judicially abolishing these laws is that if the right to 
surreptitiously record under the First Amendment becomes widely ac-
cepted throughout the United States, then people who are prevented 
from doing so will have civil remedies under federal law.256 The police 
would be stripped of qualified immunity from lawsuits, thus discourag-
ing them from enforcing state laws that may still prohibit such re-
cording.257 Currently, legislatures may view these laws as protecting the 
police’s right to privacy, and therefore may be hesitant to make the 
necessary statutory changes.258 If there were wide-spread acceptance by 
courts of a citizen’s right to record police surreptitiously, however, there 
would be pressure on state legislatures to pass laws conforming with the 
courts’ interpretation of First Amendment rights.259 
 The down side to a judicial solution is that more time, expense, 
and litigation must occur in order for the courts to find the proper 
cases in which to assert this right.260 It also does not solve the immedi-
ate threat of police still enforcing the laws on the books to arrest those 
who record them.261 Unfortunately, that threat will still act as a deter-
rent for individuals to exercise the right to record.262 
B. Legislatures Protecting the Right to Record 
 The best option to protect people’s right to surreptitiously record 
the police would be for the state legislatures to explicitly permit such 
recordings.263 While a federal legislative solution could ensure the right 
to record police uniformly across the United States, state legislatures 
are the more sensible option.264 Moreover, this solution would ensure 
that state laws encourage this safeguard against police misconduct.265 
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 Since the purpose of the federal wiretapping statute is to protect 
the right to privacy, states may further expand on that right.266 In fact, 
states have already done so by requiring all party consent or excluding 
the requirement of a reasonable expectation to privacy, which in turn 
has expanded the right to privacy to cover public conversations.267 
Therefore, a federal statute attempting to balance protections between 
a right to record under the First Amendment and a right to privacy may 
inherently lead to further litigation on which right supersedes the 
other.268 Since state legislatures were the ones who already expanded 
privacy rights, they should be the ones to cut back on their own laws 
when it comes to recording on-duty police officers.269 
 Massachusetts and Illinois have already made the policy decision to 
further protect their citizens’ privacy rights by excluding a reasonable 
expectation of privacy from their wiretapping and eavesdropping 
laws.270 By creating an exception to their laws that permits the surrepti-
tious recording of on-duty police, they can maintain those protections 
for civilians while also providing the necessary safeguards against exces-
sive force and racially discriminatory police misconduct.271 An explicit 
exception allowing both secret and open recordings of on-duty police 
makes it perfectly clear that police may not use the law to deter citizens 
from capturing footage of potential misconduct.272 
 In order to fully safeguard the public from police misconduct, the 
laws in Massachusetts and Illinois must unambiguously state that sur-
reptitiously recording on-duty police is a legal practice.273 While estab-
lishing the right to surreptitiously record on-duty police is viable 
through both judicial and legislative routes, state legislatures are in the 
best position to make the right explicit and to ensure that citizens are 
not deterred from exercising that right.274 
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Conclusion 
 As a result of technological advancements, recording police mis-
conduct surreptitiously and widely disseminating the footage is easier 
now than ever before. With police misconduct so prevalent in today’s 
society, every safeguard must be made available to citizens. For those in 
minority communities, who are often targeted and abused by racist po-
lice practices, protecting themselves is of upmost importance. In addi-
tion, surreptitious recordings of racist police misconduct have caught 
the attention of both the public at large and the DOJ, leading to inves-
tigations and reforms in police practices. 
 Unfortunately, in Massachusetts and Illinois, the inability of the 
citizens to legally record police surreptitiously presents the risk of hav-
ing racist police practices going undetected and unaddressed. It is im-
perative that changes in the law be made so that people in those states 
can take advantage of this important safeguard against police miscon-
duct. The state legislatures in Massachusetts and Illinois should pass 
legislation carving out an exception in their wiretapping and eaves-
dropping laws that expressly allows for citizens to legally record on-duty 
police officers surreptitiously. 
